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ABSTRACT 
William Langer is firmly established as a legend in 
North Dakota history. The legend began during his 
controversial terms as attorney general (1916-1920) and 
governor (1932-1934 and 1936-1938). A maverick in the 
United States Senate after his election to the upper 
chamber in 1940, admirers saw him as a civil libertarian 
and a defender of the "common man." The loyalty and 
devotion of his constituents increased over the years 
because of his willingness to do favors for them and 
because of his considerable campaign skills. However, a 
study of his papers, the Congressional Record, and 
newspaper and magazine articles reveals that Langer 
introduced few bills that were enacted into law. In 
addition, he was not taken seriously by his fellow Senators 
and often devoted his time in Congress to the obstruction 
of Senate business. 
The first chapter outlines Langer's career before he 
entered the Senate in 1941, paying particular attention to 
the development of his political ideas and strategies. The 
second chapter is an assessment of Langer's peculiar habits 
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in the Senate, as well as a summation of the the views of 
his colleagues and of the national media towards the North 
Dakotan. 
Chapter three questions the notion that Langer was a 
humanitarian liberal by concluding that his advocacy of 
liberal causes was severely limited by his inability to 
translate his ideas into law. Few of Langer's proposals 
were taken seriously; his civil rights proposals in par-
ticular were usually intended to obstruct Senate business by 
·fostering heated debate. 
Chapter four examines Langer's opposition to the 
Internal Security Act of 1950 and concludes that, although 
Langer argued against the Act on civil libertarian grounds, 
his opposition was actually based on the limits the Act 
placed on immigration by Germans. 
Chapter five details Langer's response to the McCarthy 
era and concludes that, although he never hesitated to 
employ anti-communist rhetoric, Langer can be properly 




The William Langer legend is still very much alive in 
North Dakota. North Dakotans born long after his death in 
1959 can recite stories told by their parents or 
grandparents about "Wild Bill." 
Most stories about Langer center around a favor that he 
did for a North Dakotan and most hint that he was probably 
corrupt. One person might tell of the time Governor Langer 
had state employees paint a relative's house; another of how 
Senator Langer got him out of the Army during World War II; 
yet another of how constituents continued to threaten 
uncooperative public officials with their intention to write 
Langer for help five years after his death. 
Although Langer had already secured a prominent 
position in North Dakota history and folklore by 1940, his 
legend continued to grow while he was in the Senate. 
Elected with less than forty percent of the vote in 1940, in 
1958 he carried every county in the state without having 
received the endorsement of any party. 
1 
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Langer's legendary status presents problems for the 
historian. Langer sought to build his legend while he was 
alive by exaggerating his early accomplishments. Con-
sequently, many facts about his early life have become 
clouded in myth. In addition, the hundreds of boxes of his. 
correspondence in the Elwyn B. Robinson Department of 
Special Collections in the Chester Fritz Library at the 
University of North Dakota present Langer as he wanted to be 
seen by his constituents. Taken alone, his papers serve 
only to add to the Langer legend. 
The legend begins to crumble, however, when one 
searches for Langer's tangible achievements. Once he 
reached the Senate, there were very few. A study of the 
Congressional Record reveals a Langer who was not taken 
seriously by his colleagues and who, with little or no 
reason, often brought the machinery of the Senate to a 
grinding halt. 
Inspired by the discovery of Langer's celebrated 
filibuster of the Internal Security Act of 1950, I decided 
to study Langer's response to the McCarthy era. That study 
proceeded for a some time under a few false premises. 
First, I assumed that Langer was under the same Cold War 
electoral pressures as other senators. Given his loyal 
personal following, however, Langer was virtually immune to 
charges based upon ideology. Second, I assumed that his 
statements were a true reflection of his political 
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philosophy. As often as not, however, his pronouncements 
were every bit as complex and contradictory as were his 
motives. Third, I assumed that Langer was taken seriously 
by his colleagues and by the media. For the most part, 
however, he was not. Langer once gleefully agreed to the 
charge that he was little more than a "messenger boy" for 
the people of North Dakota. A study of his career in the 
Senate makes it clear that this claim was more than a 
campaign ploy. If one must assess Langer's accomplishments 
in Washington, they would probably amount to little more 
than the favors he did for individual constituents. Langer 
spent more time talking on the Senate floor than did most of 
his colleagues, but he accomplished little or nothing by 
doing so. 
Yet, Langer loyalists in North Dakota and around the 
nation continued to hail him as a champion of the common 
person, and the voters of North Dakota, as well as his 
colleagues in the Senate, grew to admire him more and more 
as time passed. 
I 
Langer's Background in North Dakota Politics 
William Langer entered upon the North Dakota political 
scene soon after he graduated with degrees in liberal arts 
and law from Columbia University in 1910. Langer was 
determined to make his classmates back east "sit up and take 
notice" of what he would accomplish in North Dakota. His 
classmates did not doubt his ability to do so; their 
prophecy was that Langer would become a United States 
Senator and be the third politician in American history to 
be "at the same time fearless and truthful." The other two 
with such qualities had been Abraham Lincoln and Theodore 
1 Roosevelt. 
After Langer had secured a position with the law firm 
of H. R. Bitzing in Mandan in 1910, Bitzing, who was Morton 
county states attorney, appointed him assistant states 
attorney. Langer soon made his mark. In one of his first 
actions as states attorney, he requested that thousands of 
acres of railroad land be put on the tax roles. The 
railroads challenged the action, but Langer both won in the 
district court and the state supreme court. The case sent a 
4 
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signal to other counties along the Northern Pacific Railroad 
line. Soon thousands of additional acres of railroad land 
were taxed as well and Langer gained a reputation for 
fighting the "interests." 
In 1914, at the age of twenty-eight, Langer ran for 
states attorney of Morton County and won handily. As states 
attorney, he concentrated on enforcing prohibition, promot-
ing badly needed property tax reform, and enforcing compul-
sory school attendance laws. His methods often caused an 
uproar. Soon after he took office, he arrested over 150 
citizens of Mandan and charged them with liquor violations. 
He also promised to arrest the parents of children who were 
not attending school. Even those who Langer's actions 
affected came to admire his determination and courage. 
As .states attorney, Langer built support for a bid to 
become North Dakota's attorney general in 1916. After 
receiving the support of temperance organizations, the 
education establishment, and the progressive wing of the 
Republican party, Langer successfully sought the endorsement 
of the Nonpartisan League. Thus was born an association 
with an organization that he would eventually turn into a 
personal machine. Langer won the election of 1916 and moved 
across the river from Mandan to the state capital in 
Bismarck. 
As attorney general, Langer continued to focus on 
morality issues. In his effort to clean up the liquor 
establishments and "bawdy houses" in the city of Minot, he 
arrested several prominent citizens and shut down the phone 
exchange at gunpoint. The phone company charged that Langer 
had illegally seized their property, and Langer was in turn 
arrested by local authorities. The arrest may have been 
intended to protect Langer from the angry citizens of Minot; 
the phone company later dropp~d charges once Langer had 
safely returned to Bismarck. 2 
Langer won a second term in 1918 but soon angered 
leaders of the Nonpartisan League by defending one of its 
opponents, Minnie Nielson. Nielson, whom a League candidate 
had defeated in the primary election for the office of state 
superintendent of public instruction, staged a campaign in 
the general election and won. Nielson's victory angered the 
League leadership, and Langer was requested to declare her 
legally unqualified for office. He refused. 
Langer further antagonized the League l~adership when 
he investigated a League-run bank in Fargo and found that it 
had loaned money equivalent to several times its capital. 
Because it was League enterprises that had borrowed the 
money, and because the bank allowed those enterprises to use 
post-dated checks collected from farmers in the form of dues 
as collateral, Langer feared that the farmers could suffer 
in the end and, consequently, closed the bank. 
By 1919 Langer believed that the Nonpartisan League had 
drifted from its original purpose and had become corrupt. 
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He accused outsiders and radicals of using the League to 
fleece North Dakota farmers. Among these radicals, 
according to Langer, were members of the Industrial Workers 
of the World (IWW). As attorney general he hired private 
detectives from Kansas City to infiltrate the labor 
federation, but was disappointed when their efforts turned 
up no evidence of radicalism or conspiracy in the IWW. 
Although Langer continued to support the League's 
original program, he decided in the fall of 1919 to run for 
governor against the NPL. During the subsequent 1920 
campaign, many believed that Langer supported the 
publication of The Red Flame, a scurrilous magazine 
dedicated to associating the Nonpartisan League with 
Bolshevism, free love, and godlessness. Langer gave 
speeches as far away as Kansas, warning farmers of the 
dangers of the League. In a marriage of convenience Langer 
accepted the nomination of the infant Independent Voters 
Association (IVA) but lost in the primary election to the 
incumbent League candidate Lynn Frazier. 
During the years from 1920 to 1928, Langer limited his 
political activity to working for the election of other 
candidates. In 1920, as he had in 1916, Langer served as 
state chairman for the committee that supported California 
Senator Hiram Johnson for the presidency. In 1924 he 
actively supported Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin for the 
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presidency, and in 1928 he backed Democrat Al Smith of New 
York. 
During these years, Langer repudiated the IVA and 
returned to the Nonpartisan League. It was a far different 
League from the one Langer had abandoned; the radical 
element, including A. C. Townley, was long gone. The League 
organization had deteriorated to little more than a shell. 
After the NFL met with disaster in the 1928 elections, its 
leadership was reshuffled and Langer took over most of the 
control. 
Langer reorganized the local League groups and made the 
primary qualification for local party positions loyalty to 
himself rather than loyalty to the League. 3 In 1930, he 
sought to revive the Leader, the defunct League organ, but 
lack of funds forced Langer to put his plans on hold. 
The Depression increased the prospects for what was now 
William Langer's Nonpartisan League. Both the League and 
the Republican party nominated Langer for the governorship 
in 1932, and with his victory, Langer became the only 
Republican governor elected in the nation that year. The 
positions he took during the campaign were vague, but he did 
come out in favor of reductions in state expenses and in 
real estate taxes. After his inauguration Langer shocked 
many supporters by advocating a 2 percent sales tax. The 
NFL-dominated legislature acceded to his wishes, but the tax 
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was inunediately referred to the voters of North Dakota and 
soundly defeated. 
Langer's first tenure as governor was filled with 
controversy. North Dakota's economy was in a crisis 
unequalled in the state's history. In 1932, in an attempt 
to help suffering farmers, Langer declared a five-year 
moratorium on farm foreclosures. He called out the National 
Guard on several occasions to enforce the moratorium, which 
many contemporary observers believed conflicted with federal 
law. 
Also in 1932, Langer declared an embargo of North 
Dakota wheat in an attempt to raise the price of grain. The 
price did go up, but because the federal government made a 
large purchase of wheat at the same time, it is not clear 
that Langer's embargo deserves the credit for the increase. 4 
The courts later declared the embargo unconstitutional. 
Langer came under fire for his administration of the 
relief funds the Federal Emergency Relief Administration 
(FERA) program provided North Dakotans. Relief request 
forms required that applicants declare who they supported 
for the office of governor in the last election and required 
the signature of the local NPL precinct committeeman. Harry 
Hopkins, the head FERA administrator in Washington, received 
numerous reports that Langer was playing politics with the 
agency's relief money. 5 
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Langer's continued efforts to revive the Leader brought 
him further trouble. After his attempts to raise money in 
1930 fell flat, Langer hit upon a scheme to assess all state 
employees 5 percent of their annual salaries to fund the 
paper. The plan came unglued when some Langer supporters 
violated a federal law by soliciting contributions from 
federal employees working in North Dakota. 
A federal trial followed in 1934, and the court found 
Langer guilty. Due to the obvious lack of impartiality on 
-the part of presiding judge Andrew Miller, who had held a 
grudge against Langer dating back to Langer's days as 
assistant states attorney, the governor stood a good chance 
of overturning the verdict upon appeal. Meanwhile, however, 
the Supreme Court ruled that Langer by virtue of the guilty 
verdict was no longer governor. Lieutenant Governor Ole 
Olson officially became the chief executive. 
Because Langer was ineligible to run for governor in 
1934, his wife Lydia ran instead. She made a respectable 
showing in the general election, but lost to Democrat Thomas 
Moody. To dispose of Moody, Langer investigated his 
background and found that he was not legally eligible to 
hold the office of governor in North Dakota. After the 
Supreme Court ousted Moody, Lieutenant Governor Walter 
Welford became North Dakota's fourth governor in seven 
months in February of 1935. 
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The courts granted Langer a second trial, but it was no 
less controversial than the first. Langer later admitted 
that he had paid money to the son of the judge, although 
Langer claimed that he owed the man the money, and critics 
charged that Langer cronies worked to influence two men on 
the jury who later caused a hung jury by refusing to vote to 
uphold Langer's conviction. A third trial found Langer not 
guilty of perjuring himself in the first trial, and a fourth 
trial on the original charges ended in a decision of "not 
guilty." Langer had avoided jail, but his support within 
the NPL and across the state had withered. 
After mending fences within the NPL, Langer won the 
League endorsement for the governorship at the 1936 
convention but lost in the primary to Walter Welford. 
Undaunted, he ran as in independent in the general election 
and won with 36 percent of the vote. 
Langer's second term as governor was only slightly less 
turbulent than his first. He immediately caused an uproar 
by firing several members of the faculty and administration 
at the agriculture college in Fargo. Many charged that 
Langer was merely attempting to assert control over the 
considerable funds spent by the college. As a direct result 
of the firings, the college lost its accreditation and was 
censured by the American Association of University 
Professors. 
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Langer continued to draw accusations of corruption. He 
sold what was generally regarded to be worthless stock to an 
attorney for the Northern Pacific Railroad for $25,000 and 
soon used his pos.i tion on the Tax Commission to lower the 
railroad's tax bill. He helped a bond firm make a 
commission of nearly a quarter of a million dollars in 
dealings with the Bank of North Dakota and then sold land to 
a partner in the firm for a sum that Langer later admitted 
to Congress was more than twice its market value. 
Langer's preoccupation with the Leader continued. 
Instead of soliciting "donations" from the salaries of state 
employees, Langer financed the paper by filling it with 
large advertisements for the state mill and elevator. It 
did not matter that there was no need for the elevator to 
advertise to the farmers from whom it purchased wheat. 6 
Langer sought a United States Senate seat in 1938 but 
met head on with the incumbent Gerald Nye who was at the 
peak of his popularity due to his investigations into the 
dealings of munitions makers during World War I. Langer 
helped Nye by ignoring national issues and concentrating 
instead upon publicizing his own record as governor. After 
losing the primary to Nye, Langer again ran as an indepen-
dent in the general election and was soundly defeated. 
To prevent Langer from doing in 1940 what he had done 
in the previous two elections, his enemies in the 
legislature passed a law which prohibited candidates from 
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running in general elections if they had been defeated for 
the same office in the primary. Their strategy backfired in 
1940 when Langer scored an upset victory in the Republican 
senatorial primary against Lynn Frazier. Langer's opponents 
believed that Frazier could win as an independent in the 
general election, but the legislature's recent actions 
legally barred him from running. Instead, William Lemke 
made the 1940 Senate race another three-way affair by 
abandoning his race for a seat in the House of Represent-
atives and running for the Senate as an independent. 
Langer won the election with only 38 percent of the 
vote, but soon faced charges of fraud. A group of North 
Dakotans would attempt to deny Langer a seat in the Senate 
due to his "moral turpitude," but William Langer had finally 
achieved his long-sought-after status as a United States 
Senator. 
The patterns established during Langer's career before 
1940 were to continue to be evident during his time in the 
Senate. 
Early in Langer's career, he saw his primary base of 
political support to be the German population of North 
Dakota. In his first political contest for the post of 
state's attorney for Morton County, each ethnic group 
supported its own candidate. Langer was the candidate of 
the Germans. In those days many of the German citizens 
spoke little or no English and Langer was the only candidate 
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who spoke German. In the predominantly German rural areas 
of the county, Langer received nearly every vote. 7 
From that first campaign onwards, Langer did not 
hesitate to address crowds in both German and English. The 
German population continued to vote heavily for him, and he 
subsequently considered German North Dakotans his own 
special constituency. 
When Langer ran for attorney general, he made direct 
appeals to the German population. In a press release during 
that campaign, Langer claimed that" ... Germans all over 
the state of North Dakota are insisting that a German who 
has made a wonderful and extraordinary record as States 
Attorney of Morton County, be their representative on the 
state republican ticket, and that William Langer be the 
candidate representing Germans. 118 During the same campaign, 
Langer's literature emphasized that "He comes from a well 
known German family and is a native of North Dakota. 119 
Langer began his political career as a Progressive; his 
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role models were Theodore Roosevelt and Robert LaFollette. 
He retained his progressive tendencies throughout his 
career, becoming something of a relic of the era during his 
later years in the Senate. His progressive background is 
crucial in explaining Langer's reaction to the politics of 
the Cold War. 
During his early career, Langer was often a moralistic 
progressive before he was a practitioner of ethnic politics. 
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As states attorney, Langer offended many Germans with his 
stringent enforcement of compulsory school attendance 
laws. 11 Langer's rigid enforcement of prohibition had also 
offended many Germans, and he sought to keep them in his 
camp by appealing to their higher ideals. According to his 
campaign literature, Langer would "not attempt to get the 
votes of Germans by promising [them] free and open saloons 
sometime in the dim future. 1112 
With the outbreak of World War I, however, prohibition 
faded into the background as German-Americans became more 
worried about attacks on their loyalty and patriotism than 
they were concerned about their right to drink beer. Langer 
wasted no time coming to the defense of individual Germans 
who came under fire, as well as to the defense of German-
Americans as a group. World War I was one of many times 
when Langer worked to strengthen his political base by 
rallying to the defense of German-Americans. Although 
Langer's German support was to decline in importance as he 
developed a constituency of personal followers which 
transcended ethnic lines, his support of the interests of 
Germans was to become a central feature of his career in the 
United States Senate. 
Langer was always an avid writer of letters. From the 
earliest years of his political career, he kept a carbon 
copy of almost every letter he mailed, whether it was 
personal or political. He rarely let even the most critical 
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or trivial of letters go unanswered, including the many 
which arrived from outside the state of North Dakota. He 
gave equal credence to every letter no matter how humble in 
appearance or origin. His attention to correspondence 
became one of Langer's most potent political weapons in the 
Senate. 
The emphasis Langer placed upon correspondence was 
merely a part of Langer's gift at the game of "personal 
politics." In a state with few people, a politician could 
build a following based not on ideology or party but on 
personal contact. According to one of his classmates at 
Columbia University, Langer had a "talent for friendship. 1113 
His extraordinary memory for names and faces as well as his 
magnetism, his impressive physical appearance, and his 
irresistable friendliness enabled him to make an impression 
upon everyone he met. His enormous energy for campaigning 
sometimes took him to the steps of a farmer's house at three 
o'clock in the morning on his way to a political speech the 
next day. 
When he campaigned for the governorship in 1932, Langer 
promised members of his audiences that if they ever had 
problems, they could just come down to his office and let 
him know. After he entered the statehouse, the waiting room 
outside his office was often full of farmers in difficulty 
due to the Depression. Langer kept his promise and spent 
long hours meeting with each of the aggrieved parties. 
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Langer had great sympathy for individual complaints and 
grievances, and he recognized that there was no better way 
to win a person's vote for many elections to come, no matter 
what his party allegiance, than by doing the person a favor. 
He reveled in situations where he was able to grant a person 
a favor. Even if a law ·were obviously flawed, Langer 
preferred to grant hundreds of individual exemptions and 
exceptions rather than to change the law. 
After he declared a moratorium on farm foreclosures 
during the Depression, it became apparent that the declar-
ation at times hurt innocent people and at other times 
helped the hated "interests." Rather than repair or replace 
the original declaration, Langer considered each case 
individually. According to historian Glenn H. Smith, Langer 
usually "served as the judge and jury and issued instruc-
tions based solely upon a note or letter from a mortagagee 
or lawyer which outlined the facts as he saw them. 1114 The 
exemptions, exceptions, and even contradictory new 
proclamations were hopelessly inconsistent and led to 
confusion. What mattered to Langer was that in each case 
the grievance was addressed, not through legislative 
maneuvering or bureaucratic procedure, but through the 
personal intervention of Bill Langer. When a troubled 
farmer received that sort of attention from the governor of 
North Dakota, he was sure to vote for Langer at the next 
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election and to repeat the story of his success to his 
friends and neighbors. 
Langer's emphasis on personal politics led him to a 
ruthless use of patronage as governor. Langer sought and 
relished control over favors to North Dakotans. The 
political benefits of granting favors were obvious to 
Langer. At the same time, Langer saw in such activity an 
opportunity to mitigate the pernicious effects the large, 
impersonal "system" had on the common people. 
Like many progressive politicians, Langer never found 
it necessary to operate within the bounds of party 
discipline. The interests of the common man transcended 
party boundaries. He developed the NPL into a personal 
political machine and cared little to appease the more 
conservative Republicans who also nominated him for 
ff . 15 o ice. 
Although he was a student of the law, Langer had little 
faith in the efficacy of law. His interest in the law was 
not that of a scholar but that of an advocate. Some might 
say Langer studied the law only to find out what he could 
get by with; it is more likely that his legal activity was 
his attempt to bring the results of the actual system of 
justice in line with his notion of "absolute justice." When 
confronted by the case of an elderly man who stood to be 
hurt badly by Langer's farm foreclosure moratorium, Langer 
wrote 11 .we will prepare a modification so that absolute 
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justice may be done. 1116 Absolute justice, in Langer's 
estimation, was possible only if each case was examined on 
its own merits and dealt with according to the dictates of 
common sense. More accurately, "absolute justice" was 
justice according to Bill Langer. 
Langer's identification of himself with the "common 
man" overshadowed his identification of himself with 
"absolute justice." Because he could not conceive of 
himself doing anything contrary to the interests of the 
common person, he interpreted any attack on himself as an 
attack on an entire class of people. However, he never made 
clear who he meant to include in the category of common 
people. In his early races Langer seemed to refer most 
often to the farmers who perceived themselves to be the 
victims of the large corporations and monopolies. Later, it 
seemed he limited common person status to members of the 
Nonpartisan League, and at other times he included all of 
the downtrodden people of the world. No matter who happened 
to be included, Langer often deflected criticism of his own 
ideas and tactics by charging that the accuser was 
committing a wrong against the common people. Langer's 
world was one of good against evil, one which pitted 
sinister interests, trusts, and monopolies against the 
conunon people and their representative Bill Langer. 
Langer first became involved with A. C. Townley's Non-
partisan League when he received the League's endorsement 
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for attorney general. He parted ways with the NPL during 
the campaign of 1920 and returned only when he was able to 
control the reconstituted League as his own political 
machine. 
Langer's split with the League is pertinent to the 
present study due to his free-wheeling use of "red scare" 
tactics to discredit the leadership of the League in the 
campaign of 1920. Although he would later bemoan the 
"hysteria" of the McCarthy era, in that earlier time of 
.hysteria, Langer did not hesitate to use every possible 
method to smear Townley and Lemke with the "red" label. 
Langer took the justification for his attacks on 
Townley and the League directly from the progressive manual. 
The League, Langer claimed, had become elitist, given over 
to long-hairs from the east who descended upon North Dakota 
to dictate policy to farmers they despised. In Langer's 
rhetoric, the League had become every bit as onerous as the 
interests and the monopolies. The NPL's control of North 
Dakota represented a rule of the many by the few. Although 
Langer's attacks on the League were more the result of his 
ambitions than his ideology, the rationale of his campaign 
was based upon hatred for monopoly and concentration of 
power. His later anti-communism would stern from the same 
progressive roots. 
Langer developed a tactical philosophy during his early 
years in government which was to guide him until his death. 
21 
Once evil was identified, it was to be destroyed by using 
every legal and rhetorical device available. To be soft in 
the face of obvious evil was inexcusable. 
In the face of so many overwhelming evils in the world, 
the rules could be stretched to benefit the downtrodden 
"common man." The ruthless use of patronage, for example, 
never seemed to Langer to contradict his otherwise prog-
ressive views. 
In May of 1941, Langer rose in the Senate to eulogize 
another champion of the "common man," Huey Long. Langer was 
probably describing his own aspirations as much as he was 
paying tribute when he declared: 
It has been said that once or twice in a 
generation nature spawns a great commoner--one who 
combines the simple, humble, honest virtues of the 
common people, the inherent fairness and decency 
of the great mass of good folks, their quick anger 
at injustice and greed. He was such a man. 
The times demanded an "enlightened fighting champion," 
Langer went on to say, and 
it was because Huey Long knew how to fight, how 
to fight fire with fire, knew how to combat 
ruthlessness with ruthlessness, force with force, 
and because he had the courage to battle 
unceasingly for what he conceived to be right that 
he became an inspiration for so many in their own 
fight for a square deal, and the object of such 
rele~tle17 persecution on the part of his 
enemies. 
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The Senate's Terrible Mr. Bang 
The stormy politics of North Dakota followed William 
Langer into the staid chambers of the United States Senate 
on January 3, 1941. As Langer was about to be sworn in, 
majority leader Alben Barkley informed him that his seating 
in the Senate had been protested by a delegation of North 
Dakotans. Until the charges could be investigated, Langer 
was seated "without prejudice." 
Langer's case was referred to the Committee on 
Privileges and Elections which sent a team of investigators 
to North Dakota. Langer urged North Dakotans to cooperate 
with the investigation, and many did, particularly his 
political enemies. So many cooperated that the 
investigation lasted for more than a year. The 4,194 pages 
of testimony submitted to the Senate included tales of 
Langer's escapades going back 27 years to his days as states 
attorney in Morton County. The grab bag of allegations 
included charges that Langer "stole" a drug store, 
unlawfully siezed telephone lines, incited a riot in Minot, 
defied federal and state courts by calling out the National 
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Guard, declared the independence of North Dakota from the 
United States, fixed juries, paid the son of a judge who was 
trying him in court, engaged in several questionable land 
and stock deals, and blackmailed state employees into 
contributing to the Nonpartisan League. 
In the end, the debate on the floor of the Senate 
became confused and it is likely that Senators who voted for 
Langer's seating were merely questioning the Senate's right 
to pass such a judgement, not registering approval of 
Langer's character or excusing his past behavior. In fact, 
Langer gleefully agreed to many of the charges and sometimes 
embellished them when he found that the investigators had 
left out colorful details. During the floor debate, Langer 
punctiliously pointed out trivial errors of fact and occa-
sionally interrupted to help Senators find the correct page 
numbers of portions of the testimony. 
Langer's unrepentant, proud attitude befuddled his 
closest advisors. At a time when humility was expected, he 
defiantly chomped on his unlit, still-wrapped cigar. The 
controversy did not end until March of 1942 when the Senate, 
after weeks of debate, rejected the recommendation of the 
comrnitLee (which had voted 13-3 to deny Langer a seat on 
grounds of "moral turpitude") and seated him by a vote of 
52-30. 
Langer was able to act as a Senator during his year of 
limbo, and he quickly established the patterns which were to 
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characterize his career in the upper chamber. He inserted 
reams of letters and editorials from North Dakotans into the 
Congressional Record. He began to introduce numerous pri-
vate bills. He was aware that he was at the mercy of his 
fellow senators, however, and did not yet begin his tactics 
of obstruction and delay on the Senate floor. 
From his seat in the Senate, Langer was able to use 
correspondence more effectively as a political instrument 
than ever before. After the United States became involved 
in World War II, many North Dakotans had complaints about 
their treatment at the hands of the many wartime boards and 
agencies. Langer's reputation for addressing individual 
complaints led many to write him seeking furloughs or 
outright discharges from the armed forces and exemptions 
from the draft. Thousands more wrote in attempts to cut 
through the layers of bureaucracy surrounding the rationing 
of machinery, tires, gasoline, radio batteries, sugar, even 
shotgun shells. II .Every place I asked what can be done 
they tell me it takes Senator Langer to get anything done," 
observed a petitioner from Elgin, North Dakota. 1 A Mr. 
Albrecht who was refused a spare tire for his car wrote, "I 
told Mr. Thompson [head of the rationing board] that if I 
don't get my tire I am going to write Bill Langer." On the 
strength of that threat alone, the board issued Albrecht a 
certificate for a spare the next day. 2 
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It is not clear whether Langer's storied reputation for 
successfully resolving complaints and for filling requests 
is deserved. Some soldiers were furloughed, a few received 
discharges, and many were exempted from the draft. These 
soldiers and their families often wrote effusive letters of 
thanks giving credit to ·Langer. However, a great majority 
of the requests for a release from duty were denied. Many 
farmers received machinery, tires, and more generous 
gasoline rations following Langer's actions, but it is 
difficult to establish exactly what influence Langer had on 
the final result. 
In most cases, Langer simply forwarded the constit-
uent's letter to the appropriate government agency and asked 
them to "see what they could do" to address the problem. 
Subsequent letters to constituents were carefully crafted to 
convey the impression that Langer had taken up the case, but 
only when obvious injustices were done did Langer employ the 
full force of his explosive rhetoric in a letter to an 
agency. 
One such case involved a recent German immigrant, 
August Bauer. After ransacking his home, the FBI accused 
Bauer of sqowing an inordinate interest in troop movements 
through Jamestown and of committing "moral indiscretions" 
with his secretary. To protect national security, Bauer was 
interred at Fort Lincoln. Bauer wrote Langer, and after 
receiving the FBI report, Langer wrote to J. Edgar Hoover 
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and offered to appear on Bauer's behalf. Although Hoover 
did not respond directly to Langer's offer, Bauer was 
quickly released. 3 
Langer's effectiveness in resolving the thousands of 
complaints which came his way during World War II cannot be 
accurately gauged. It is certain, however, that through the 
careful use of these thousands of grievances he was able to 
expand his personal political base. Langer was indis-
criminate in whom he helped and delighted in treating the 
requests of his political enemies with as much interest as 
he treated the complaints of his political cronies. How 
could a farmer, Republican or Democrat, not vote for a man 
who, it seemed at least, had pulled the right strings to get 
a combine delivered to the farm just in time for the 
harvest? 
Langer employed many methods of using a constituent's 
correspondence to make the writer feel important. Hundreds, 
probably thousands of his replies began, "I can't tell you 
how long it has been since I received such a fine letter as 
yours." It did not matter that many of the requests from 
constituents were written on the back of envelopes or shabby 
notepads. One barely legible note contained a simple 
request: "Dear Bill, Please see what you can do about 
getting me an alarm clock. 114 In this case as in many 
others, there was nothing Chester Bowles, the Director of 
the Office of Price Administration, or any of the other 
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agency heads Langer wrote could do to solve the problem. In 
the end, however, the farmer had a handful of letters to 
prove that for one moment at least, the attention of Wash-
ington had been riveted on his lack of an alarm clock. 
Langer quickly discovered that the Congressional Record 
provided an unparalled opportunity to make North Dakotans 
feel as though a national audience heard their views and 
complaints. When Langer inserted a letter from a constit-
uent into the Record, he would later write the author of the 
letter a note, claiming that the letter was "so important" 
that he had placed it in the Record for all senators to 
read. When he inserted editorials from weekly small-town 
newspapers in the Record, he could be assured that the 
entire readership of the paper would feel honored, to say 
nothing of the editor. 
Organizations often would send Langer suggested 
resolutions and he would introduce them, even if one 
contradicted a resolution from another group which Langer 
would introduce at the same time. It did not matter that 
the resolutions were inevitably dead-on-arrival when 
referred to committee. It was important only that Langer 
could write the group that theirs was such a fine resolution 
that he had decided to introduce it on the floor of the 
Senate. 
Langer would stop at nothing to give one of his 
constituents a sense of importance. In a state beleagured 
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by a sense of inferiority, there could be no better campaign 
tool. In a state with as small a population as North 
Dakota's, it was not difficult to build a loyal political 
base through the skillful use of constituent correspondence. 
Langer rarely disagreed openly with the content of letters 
that came to him from North Dakota, no matter what views the 
constituent expressed. Even virulently racist letters did 
not stir Langer, as long as they came from his home state. 
Langer responded to an violently anti-Semetic letter from a 
Fargo resident with a letter which, although it did not 
repeat any of the specific claims made by the constituent, 
began by stating, "You are so absolutely right in your 
letter of November 28, that it is pitiful even to answer 
. t .. 5 1 • 
Langer's propensity to grant individual exceptions to 
his edicts as governor translated in the Senate into an 
unending stream of private bills "for the relief of" 
individual people, particularly refugees and other aliens 
seeking to get into the United States or to be considered 
for citizenship. When a constituent suggested a change in 
the immigration laws, Langer wrote, "It has always been my 
position that orphans, refugees, escapees and expellees may 
best be helped by the enactment of separate, emergency 
refugee legislation ... rather than by amending our basic 
immigration law. 116 
After Langer was seated in March of 1942, he turned 
more attention to debates on the floor of the Senate. 
Langer knew his fate was no longer in the hands of his 
fellow senators, and he immediately began to take advantage 
of the rules of the Senate to obstruct bills that he did not 
like and to promote causes dear to his heart. 
In 1943 Langer gave a full view of what the Senate 
would come to expect of "the terrible Mr. Bang," as 
columnist Drew Pearson labelled him. 7 In April of that year 
he issued a messianic cry for a nation-wide revival of the 
Nonpartisan League to oppose the two established parties 
which he insisted were run by the "interests. 118 The 
project fell flat, but that did not prevent Langer from 
demanding an investigation of the Republican convention of 
1940, which he claimed nominated Wendell Willkie at the 
behest of none other than Harry Hopkins. 9 
The Senate got its first taste of a Lariger temper 
tantrum in 1943 when Senator Joseph Guffy of Pennsylvania, 
while engaged in a dispute with a South Dakota senator, 
mistakenly attacked corruption in North Dakota instead of 
South Dakota. When Langer corrected him at length, Guffy 
said that he did not need to discuss corruption in Langer's 
home state because it was already so evident, and that 11 I 
would not be surprised if today some of the Senators who 
voted in favor of seating the Senator would, if they had the 
opportunity, reconsider the vote they cast to seat him. 1110 
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Such a gratuitous attack sent Langer into orbit. He 
obtained the floor and launched into a virulent diatribe 
against Guffy, charging, among other allegations, that a 
Guffy aide had violently raped a woman and that Guffy had 
full knowledge of the rape but did nothing. When finished 
with the Pennsylvanian, ·Langer moved back to his own career 
in North Dakota politics, which he recalled in lengthy 
detail. 
Attempts to get Langer to yield failed, and when 
Senator Thomas Connally of Texas attempted to trick Langer 
into giving up the floor by calling him aside and whispering 
into his ear while a second senator claimed that Langer had 
stopped talking, the presiding officer returned the floor to 
Langer. When Langer subsequently refused to yield to 
Connally, the Texas Senator said, "The Senator was quite 
willing to yield a year or two ago," referring to Langer's 
relative tameness before the Senate voted to seat him. 11 
It was the method to Langer's madness that most 
irritated his fellow Senators: claiming ill health, Langer 
managed to get permission from the presiding officer of the 
Senate to have the clerk read his speech while he sat. When 
the speech.deteriorated into the reading of a stream of 
newspaper and magazine articles about the 1940 election, it 
become apparent that Langer had devised an ingenious method 
of filibuster. When an exasperated Senator Scott Lucas of 
Illinois asked the presiding officer if the clerk could be 
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compelled to read until "he is out of breath," the officer 
replied that nothing in the rules could limit the length of 
time to be taken. 12 
Although Langer usually had to read his own speeches 
from that time on, he devised many other ways of obstructing 
the business of the Senate. One of his favorite methods was 
to derail debate on a bill to which he was opposed by 
introducing an irrelevant, yet controversial amendment. 
Thus, when in 1948 Langer opposed the repeal on the tax on 
oleomargerine, a measure which would have hurt North Dakota 
dairy farmers, he did so by adding a lengthy anti-lynching 
bill as an amendment. It did not matter to Langer that the 
amendment was an exact replica of a bill that had been 
introduced separately, and that the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, B'nai Brith, and other 
civil rights organizations deplored Langer's use of civil 
rights to obstruct other bills. Langer's strategy was not 
so much to have the amendment passed, but to see if he could 
spawn a filibuster by luring the Senate into debating one of 
his amendments. 
In June 1948 Langer sought to slow the passage of a 
defense appropriations bill by introducing a series of civil 
rights amendments ranging from one prohibiting the poll tax 
to one prohibiting the armed forces from doing business with 
contractors using discriminatory hiring practices. When one 
of these threatened to stir debate, Senator Lucas stood up 
to remind the Senate that there was a "general under-
standing" that Senators were to "submerge their convictions" 
on civil rights to prevent a filibuster. The Senate 
leadership had prepared for Langer's tactics on this 
occasion, but they had not prepared enough. Langer's final 
anti-discrimination amendment stirred a long debate until it 
was finally passed, only to be reconsidered and later 
defeated. Langer had succeeded. The business of the Senate 
had been disrupted, and nobody doubted Langer's opposition 
to the defense appropriations bill. 13 
Another defense appropriations bill provided Langer an 
opportunity for further mischief in 1951. After the Senate 
passed an amendment to cut the defense appropriation by 2.5 
percent, Langer decided that the time might be right for 
deeper cuts and offered an amendment to slash the approp-
riation by 50 percent. Infuriated that a 2.5 percent cut 
was brought to a vote while his 50 percent cut was ruled out 
of order, Langer decided to find out just what decrease 
would be acceptable to the presiding officer. He tried a 40 
percent cut, but it was ruled out of order, as was a 30 
percent cut and a 20 percent cut. 
He then tried a new tack. Instead of cutting the 
defense budget, why not make sure some of the funds went 
towards useful projects? One by one, Langer offered 
amendments to use five billion dollars of defense funds to 




amendments to use five billion dollars of defense funds to 
provide telephone service for poor farmers, to provide 
student loans for those who had been rejected by the Armed 
Forces and were thus disqualified from receiving the 
benefits of the GI Bill, to provide free urinalysis for all 
citizens (with a limit of one test per six months), and to 
provide for the construction of elevator facilities to store 
surplus grain. All the amendments were rejected, as was 
another that proposed to use defense funds for the 
construction of a four-lane interstate highway system. ''It 
seems to me that no better defense could be provided our 
country than would be provided by good roads," Langer said, 
without realizing that only a few years would pass before 
the Eisenhower administration would fall in line with his 
proposal. But Langer was not serious; he gleefully agreed 
to a modification of the amendment by Senator Russell Long 
of Louisiana which stipulated that two of the proposed 
highways cross the state of North Dakota, and the amendment 
. d 14 was reJecte . 
Although Langer's filibustering seemed to accomplish 
little, it served several of his purposes: He was 
obstructing a bill to which he was opposed at the same time 
that he was promoting his pet projects. In addition, Langer 
could solemnly write his constituents informing them of the 
introduction of his various high-sounding amendments without 
mentioning that his measures had not been taken seriously by 
the Senate. 
On June 10, 1948, Langer announced that he would object to 
any and every bill put forward by the Senate. His committee 
had worked for two years on a bill to provide maternity 
leave for government employees, Langer protested, only to 
have a member of the committee block the bill by objecting 
to it. Therefore, "so long as we cannot take care of poor 
defenseless women, I shall object to every bill. 1115 After 
the presiding officer lamented that there was really no use 
calling the calendar "as long as the Senator objects en bloc 
to all subsequent bills, 1116 Senator John Williams of 
Delaware, the senator guilty of blocking the maternity leave 
bill, rose to protest. If Langer had been at all serious in 
trying to pass the bill, Williams said, he would have made 
an attempt to follow the proper procedures in the 
committee. 17 Sufficiently shamed, Langer sat down. As was 
so often the case, Langer's proposals were doomed by the 
ineptness of their construction and by his apparent lack of 
sincerity. 
In January of 1949, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, 
himself a noted filibuster artist, proposed a cloture rule 
that was clearly aimed at Langer. Although he opposed the 
bill, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia said "if it takes a 
thief to catch a thief," Morse was the one to put a stop to 
tactics of delay and obstruction. 18 After discovering that 
the new rule would include limits to debate on amendments, 
Langer rose in indignation. He was opposed, he said, to 
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anything designed" ... to keep a Senator from a small 
state from laying bare upon the floor of the Senate the 
feelings of the people of his state. 1119 When Senator 
William Knowland of California charged that Stalin must have 
been happy with Langer's attempts to stop the peacetime 
draft through the use of a filibuster, Langer exploded that 
he had done "nothing that even savors of a filibuster," and 
that he was merely quoting the views of "church after 
church, Rotary clubs, the Farmer's Union, and boards of 
higher education." He was only doing his duty, he claimed, 
by "bringing to the attention of the Senate the views of the 
people of his state. 1120 
Langer's tantrums became commonplace and were easily 
provoked. Langer delighted in teasing other Senators into 
believing that he was about to begin a tirade. He would 
then watch in glee as his colleagues scrambled to appease 
him before it was too late. In the early years, Senators 
not yet trained in the art of handling "Wild Bill 11 often 
made grave mistakes that cost hours upon hours of the 
Senate's time. By 1951, however, it seemed that his fellow 
senators had learned that the best way to get Langer to sit 
down was to humor him through effusive compliments or to 
join in his "opera bouffe," as one senator labelled one of 
21 Langer's shows. Many senators seemed to share the 
attitude of Senator Herman Welker of Idaho: "The Senator 
[Langer] has spent his adult lifetime serving the people of 
North Dakota. Whether we like it or not, the people of 
North Dakota like it. 1122 
Langer's shenanigans usually did little more than 
disrupt Senate bu~iness. Occasionally, however, they 
brought the institution a good deal of shame. Such was the 
case in March of 1949 when Langer's hatred of Winston 
Churchill caused an incident that left many a senator 
embarrassed. When Churchill visited the United States in 
March of 1949, Langer charged on the Senate floor that 
Churchill, a "cunning hypocrite," a fascist and a "cold-
blooded foreign propagandist" had "done all he could" to 
defeat the United States in the Spanish-American war. 23 In 
a wire sent to Senator Connally the next day, Churchill said 
"The statement made by Mr. Langer is entirely devoid of the 
truth." Churchill had been to Cuba, but left the island two 
years before fighting between the Americans and the Spanish 
24 broke out. Langer was berated by many newspapers for the 
irresponsible charges, even by those publications 
traditionally friendly to him. But nothing would dissuade 
Langer from repeating the charges with even more lurid 
rhetoric the next day, adding the allegation that Churchill 
had started the Cold War at Fulton, Missouri. 25 
In 1952, Langer welcomed Churchill back to the United 
States by suggesting in a widely publicized telegram to the 
rector of the Old North Church that two lanterns be hung in 
the belfry of the "hallowed edifice." Just as Paul Revere 
warned the colonists that the British were coming, " 
our fellow countrymen should be equally warned and alerted 
26 today." The ploy earned Langer a great many letters of 
praise from constituents and other citizens from across the 
nation who were equally suspicious of the British prime 
. . t 27 m1n1s er. 
One of Langer's pet projects in the Senate was the 
promotion of North Dakotans for federal appointments. He 
repeatedly extolled the virtues of North Dakotans on the 
Senate floor and noted the lack of federal appointees from 
North Dakota. To get his point across, Langer often 
filibustered routine confirmations of presidential 
appointments. His methods varied. After objecting to the 
nomination of one William Jennings Bryan (no apparent 
relation to the politician) to the post of customs collector 
in District 27 of California, Langer noted that President 
Truman had appointed nobody from North Dakota and proceeded 
to list hundreds of appointees from other states. 28 
Langer later bemoaned the lack of a cabinet level 
appointee from North Dakota. To emphasize his point, Langer 
went through all of the cabinet posts, listing for each the 
states that had at one time or another had a native son 
appointed to the post. At other times, he would merely read 
biographical sketches of North Dakota citizens he thought 
qualified for federal service, or biographies of great North 
29 Dakotans of the past. 
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Many of Langer's statements on the Senate floor 
stretched credulity to its limits. When Senator Olin 
Johnston of South Carolina charged that the Indians of North 
Dakota were as unqualified to govern due to their lack of 
education as were the blacks of South Carolina, Langer 
retorted that over half of the Indians of North Dakota had 
degrees from Harvard, Yale, Columbia, or the University of 
North Dakota. 30 Such wild exaggerations were commonplace 
for Langer and were rarely refuted by other Senators. 
To the extent that Langer cooperated with anyone on the 
floor of the Senate, he worked most closely with other 
Senators who were outside of the Senate's inner club. Upon 
Langer's death in 1959, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, a 
prominent Senate outsider, said, "After I became a member of 
the Senate, there was no member of this body with whom I had 
closer association or stronger ties than with Senator 
31 Langer.'' Hubert Humphery and Langer humored each other as 
friendly rivals from adjacent states on the floor of the 
Senate before Humphery became accepted as a member of the 
Senate elite. Towards the end of Langer's career, however, 
Humphery's presidential ambitions and constant mailings to 
Langer's office had begun to grate on the increasingly 
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cranky North Dakotan. Wayne Morse of Oregon, as 
dedicated a non-conformist as Langer and every bit as 
cantankerous, often rose in Langer's defense and seemed to 
regard Langer as something of a mentor. 33 Margaret Chase 
41 
Smith and Langer were on friendly terms throughout Langer's 
time in the Senate, sharing an interest in the direct 
popular election of the president and the rights of women. 
Smith offered to campaign for Langer in 1958, but Langer did 
not mount a campaign in that, his final election. 34 
Langer had as little regard for party loyalty in the 
Senate as he had had in his eaily career. When criticized 
for a lack of party loyalty in January 1951, Langer gave his 
views towards the Republican party, of which he was little 
more than a nominal member. " ... I owe the Republican 
party in North Dakota absolutely nothing, 1135 he fumed, 
adding later that "The regular Republican party is not 
interested in William Langer. I am a branch of it myself, 
the farmer-labor branch of the Republican party ... 1136 In 
1947 Langer informed the Senate that if a bill to amend the 
Civil Service Retirement Act did not pass, he would advise 
h . t. t t · 37 1s cons 1 uents o vote Democratic. 
In debate on the Senate floor, Langer was as likely to 
direct his venom against the Republican party as he was 
against the Democrats. In February 1951, he railed against 
the Democratic-controlled Congress for taking so long to 
pass legislation providing money to fight the Korean War. 
The Democrats should have no problem passing such a law 
overnight, Langer insisted, since "every time they have been 
in office there has been a war. 1138 Nevertheless, only three 
months later Langer attacked the Republicans for having "the 
consummate gall to rise and say that the Democrats are the 
war party. 1139 
Langer seemed unconcerned that his defiance of party 
ties would hamper his effectiveness as a legislator in the 
tradition-bound United States Senate. Only rarely did 
legislation other than private bills authored by Langer pass 
the Senate, and the private bills passed unquestioned on the 
strength of senatorial courtesy. He did not need the 
Republican party in the Senate because he had no serious 
legislative goals. He did not need the Republican party in 
North Dakota because his constituency there was based upon 
personal, not party, ties. 
Langer was perfectly willing, however, to accept the 
spoils of the seniority system when he was the senior member 
of the Republican party on the Judiciary Committee in 1952. 
The Republicans took control of the Senate in that year's 
election, and Langer was to become the chairman of the 
powerful committee. Senator Knowland, no friend of 
Langer's, called for an exception to the seniority system to 
exclude Langer from the chairmanship, but other Senators 
were wary that the entire pecking order would collapse and 
allowed Langer to take control. The position was to give 
Langer what Time magazine called "nuisance leverage. 1140 
Langer's first year at the helm of the important 
committee went smoothly. An Eisenhower administration 
official went so far as to say that "Bill has been mellowed 
by time and responsibility. 1141 Some even called him "Mild 
Bill." 
But Knowland's worst fears were confirmed in 1954 when 
the nomination of Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the United 
States had to pass through Langer's Judiciary Committee. 
Although Langer steadfastly denied the charges, the national 
media and most of his fellow senators accused him of 
unnecessarily delaying Warren's nomination for well over a 
month. Langer insisted upon airing a series of questionable 
letters charging that Warren was a communist and that he had 
allowed organized crime to establish its headquart~rs in 
California. He also took the unprecedented step of 
requesting an FBI investigation into Warren's past. 
The explanation of Langer's actions was simple: 
Eisenhower had snubbed Langer by not seeking the North 
Dakota senator's approval of several federal appointments in 
the state, including a judgeship and several postmaster 
positions. Langer guarded his power of patronage most 
jealously, and the media and other members of the Senate 
assumed that the delay of the Warren nomination was in 
f ' h I • • • • t 42 revenge or Eisen ower s 1nsens1t1v1 y. 
Such charges sent Langer into a rage. He took to the 
Senate floor to defend himself against what he perceived to 
be an attack on his integrity. Almost with pride, he 
inserted many editorials protesting his delay tactics into 
the Congressional Record. There was no deliberate delay, 
according to Langer. He was only doing his job by 
investigating every charge, and he was staying up late at 
night despite his ill health to do so. Langer contended 
that the delay was due to the number of objections filed 
against Warren and that if Eisenhower had nominated a jurist 
instead of a politician there would have been fewer such 
b . . 43 o Jections. 
Langer's "thoroughness" was defended by Senators Morse, 
Long, and Kefauver, but other senators were furious. 
Knowland renewed his efforts to remove Langer from the chair 
of the Judiciary Committee. 44 
Langer had supported Warren in his unsuccessful 
presidential campaign of 1952 and was personally acquainted 
with the future Chief Justice. 45 But Langer would go to 
almost any length to defend his patronage privileges, even 
if that meant he had to call into question the integrity of 
a man he knew to be innocent. 
National magazines had singled out Langer as one of the 
worst senators long before the Warren affair. "A lone-wolf, 
incapable of cooperation, 63-year-old Langer has probably 
introduced more trivial bills than any other Senator," 
reported a Time article in 1950 listing the eight "most 
46 d · 1 . 1 . h expendable" senators. Accor ing to a ater artic e int e 
magazine, Langer had a reputation "for being long on wind 
and trivial proposals, short on judgement and 
accomplishment; he was on.almost all lists of the ten worst 
Senators. 1147 Time earlier had referred to Langer as the 
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"beady-eyed" Senator from North Dakota. 
U. S. News was befuddled by Langer's plan to enter law 
practice to finance a Senate anti-monopoly investigation in 
1954. "He has to do it that way, he says, because the 
Senate leadership stalled his request for $37,500 for 
committee operations ... Old-timers around the Capitol 
cannot recollect a similar instance in the past." According 
to the magazine, "Langer frequently is involved in unusual 
.situations." His imposition of the legally questionable 
grain embargo as governor was cited as but one example of 
h . d' b·1· 49 is unpre icta i ity. 
Of the national magazines, The Saturday Evening Post 
printed the most serious attempt to understand Langer. 
Because Langer had become chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee and could therefore no longer be ignored, the Post 
sent its Washington editor Beverly Smith to North Dakota in 
1954, soon after Langer was accused of being a part of an 
alien smuggling racket. Smith's lengthy and comprehensive 
article provides one of the most insightful investigations 
of Langer's personality available to this day. Even so, she 
was frustrated by her subject and called her article a 
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"feeble attempt" to understand the tumultuous senator. 
After 1954, Langer faded from the national scene until 
his death in 1959, thus escaping further criticism. After 
his death, however, Newsweek spoke of Langer's ability to 
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raise "unskirted hell on the floor of the u. S. Senate." In 
addition, "Except on farm and foreign policy, he seemed to 
have no consistent philosophy." The only tribute the 
magazine could muster was to say that" in a time of 
political conformity, the Senate lost one of its most 
dedicated non-conformists. 1151 
Langer seemed to derive just as much satisfaction from 
criticism as he did from praise. If he was criticized in 
the editorials of national news magazines, he was sure to 
insert the articles into the Record. A North Dakota report-
er who covered many Langer campaigns wrote, "He appeared 
happiest when his actions startled people. Generally he 
seemed to take the attitude that all publicity, even if 
unfavorable, was good publicity. 1152 
When William Langer entered the Senate, he entered an 
office conducive to the efficient development of a personal 
constituency. But despite his increasing support in North 
Dakota, Langer's days of effectiveness as a government 
official were over. From 1940 on his only contributions to 
the formation of public policy would be wind and noise. 
In addition to Langer's remarkable memory for names and 
energy for campaigning, he succeeded in expanding his 
support in North Dakota during his undistinguished Senate 
career for three reasons: First, his reputation for "get-
ting things done'' on behalf of his constituents grew to the 
level of myth. Second, his unabashed, eloquent defenses of 
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North Dakota gave the citizens of the state a feeling of 
pride and a sense that their interests were protected in 
Washington. Third, Langer so identified himself with his 
home state that he was able to present an attack on himself 
as an attack on the people of North Dakota. Any criticism 
of him by the national or even the regional media thus 
worked to his own benefit. 
Langer never made the transition from being a lawyer in 
the wild west to being a legislator in Washington. He had 
no patience for the legislative process. It had been 
difficult enough for him to cope with the limits on his 
power in the governor's office in Bismarck. It was 
impossible for him to cooperate or compromise with his 
fellow senators in Washington. 
Towards the end of Langer's career, the anger many 
senators felt towards him during his early years in the 
Senate dissipated and was replaced by mere exasperation. It 
was apparent that Langer had used his "talent for friend-
ship" to win over many of his early detractors in the same 
way that he won over North Dakota voters, and by the time of 
his death, Langer's colleagues admired him for his 
humanitarianism and friendliness. 
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III 
Langer: A Humanitarian Liberal? 
It would be possible to ~xamine William Langer's record 
in the Senate and conclude that he was a consistent and 
perpetual advocate of human rights and civil liberties. A 
perusal of the index to the Congressional Record shows that 
from the time he went to Washington in 1941 until his death 
in 1959, Langer was sympathetic to a wide variety of liberal 
causes. Indeed, given the nature of some of his proposals, 
it is possible to argue that Langer was many years ahead of 
his time. 
In the realm of civil rights, Langer consistently 
pressed for equality for blacks. It would be difficult to 
accuse him of doing so in order to gain votes: North 
Dakota's black population numbered only in the hundreds, and 
for most North Dakotans, civil rights was not a pressing 
issue in the 1940's and early 1950's. His support for 
racial justice for all ethnic minorities was consistent 
throughout his entire career in the Senate. 
In 1943 Langer protested discriminatory hiring 
practices in the navy shipyards. In a long speech on the 
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Senate floor, Langer recited the heroics of black men in 
stories taken from what he called the "then uncensored" 
press of 1941, and expressed outrage that black federal 
employees, despite their competence, were still treated 
unfairly. 1 
Later in the same month, Langer introduced a bill to 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of color in the WAVES. 
"With the WAACs and WAVEs fighting for four freedoms all 
over the world," he observed, "how strange it is that there 
should be the necessity here in the United States for a bill 
of this character. 112 
Later, Langer proposed that Federal aid to public 
schools be tied to the elimination of discrimination on the 
basis of race, creed, or color. He cited statistics from an 
unnamed state which allegedly provided schools $66.21 per 
white student and $12.62 for each black student. 3 In 1945, 
Langer introduced a bill to prohibit any college or Univer-
sity that, in the opinion of the United States Commissioner 
of Education, "in any manner discriminates against any 
person on account of race, color, or creed, or on account of 
his views with respect to such discrimination, or in any way 
attempts to prevent or restrain the freedom of expression of 
such views by any person" from receiving federal funds. 4 
In 1948, Langer stated that " ... There is more 
discrimination against Negroes today than at any time since 
5 the turn of the century." 
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Langer and Senator Olin Johnston of South Carolina 
sparred over racial matters in the spring of 1949. Had 
Johnston done anything while governor of his state to permit 
the Negro to vote? The southerner replied that he had not. 
Was Johnston a white supremacist, and if so, why? John-
ston's position was that he merely favored a system in which 
those who were most qualified to rule were in control of the 
government. Would Langer want North Dakota's Indians to 
have too much control? 6 
Johnston's refusal to help the blacks in his state 
stood in contrast to Langer's consistent work on behalf of 
the Indians of North Dakota throughout his entire career. 
From the time when Langer broke into the Fort Yates jail to 
confer with five Indians he was to defend successfully in a 
murder trial until his last days in the Senate he worked to 
help individual Indians whom he believed had been wronged by 
"the system." As usual, however, Langer's help was limited 
to individual cases and his effective legislation was 
limited to private bills. The bills he introduced to 
require that the Bureau of Indian Affairs be headed by an 
Indian and his proposals to grant reservations greater self-
government were not serious attempts to change the law. 
Despite his refusal to disagree with anti-Semetic 
letters he received from constituents, it is difficult to 
charge Langer with anti-Semitism. In 1943, Langer delivered 
a long speech on the Senate floor in favor of a Jewish 
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homeland in Palestine and in favor of Jewish representation 
in the future United Nations. He qualified his support for 
a new Isreal, however, by adding that any state developed 
for the Jewish people would have to allow "the full civic 
and religious rights to the non-Jewish inhabitants of 
Palestine ... 117 
Langer's belief in the equality of all races led him to 
introduce many bills that would admit displaced persons into 
the United States without regard to their nationality. 8 He 
opposed racially based immigration quotas as well, but his 
support for an equitable immigration policy was limited to 
the introduction of sweeping, simplistic bills. 
Langer was a consistent advocate for those who were 
persecuted for their religious beliefs during World War II. 
He defended Jehovah's Witnesses who claimed that they were 
abused while incarcerated for concientious refusal to serve 
in the armed forces. In 1949, Langer introduced a resolu-
tion urging the President to pardon all convicted for their 
refusal to serve during World War II due to their religious 
. . 9 
convictions. 
According to the index of the Congressional Record, 
Langer annually introduced a constitutional amendment to 
provide equal rights for women. He also introduced or 
supported legislation to abolish poll taxes, to prevent the 
lynching of Indians, to prevent the lynching of blacks in 
the armed forces, to provide jobs for the handicapped, to 
provide for German war orphans, provide financial relief for 
all persons detained as enemy aliens, to remove racial re-
strictions on naturalization, to permit Indians to select 
the commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to 
prohibit child labor, to prevent the use of animals in 
experimentation, to provide maternity leave for federal 
employees, to regulate the use of wire-tapping and listening 
devices, to provide for the direct election of the 
President, to establish a national Infantile Paralysis 
.clinic, to provide aid to crippled veterans, to increase the 
benefits of serviceman's dependents, to prevent the drafting 
of fathers, to provide maternity care for wives of enlisted 
men, to prevent discrimination against blacks in Washington 
D. C. restaurants, to provide special parcel post rates for 
the blind, to abolish the Electoral College, to provide 
stools for all postal clerks, to establish a federal agency 
for the handicapped, to establish a federal advisory 
committee for the blind, to fund cancer research, to pro-
vide for libraries in rural areas, to encourage world dis-
armament, and to prohibit the production of nuclear 
10 
weapons. 
The titles of his proposed bills make an impressive 
list, but Langer was no Hubert Humphery. Langer's bills 
were simplistically worded and not designed to pass. At 
best they were intended to appear as a statement of Langer's 
ideals and at their worst they were designed to look good in 
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a letter to a constituent. Furthermore, it did not matter 
to Langer that existing law rendered some of his measures 
unnecessary. 
Most of his civil rights proposals were not serious 
attempts to pass effective legislation but rather were 
introduced as amendments to agriculture or defense measures 
in an attempt to kill or at least delay the passage of bills 
Langer did not like. Although there is no question that 
Langer believed in racial equality, his civil rights 
proposals were mischievous attempts to derail Senate debate 
by broaching the most controversial topic possible. Often, 
Langer succeeded. For example, he often introduced anti-
lynching bills as obstructive amendments to agriculture 
bills. Langer objected fiercely to a bill to repeal the tax 
on oleomargerine, for example, and responded by attempting 
to amend the bill to prevent lynching. 11 Although he 
received the support of some civil rights groups and the 
admiration of many supporters of civil rights groups, others 
rightly accused him of using civil rights as a political 
tool. Senators who dared point out that anti-lynching 
legislation had little to do with oleomargerine taxes were 
treated to long, indignant diatribes attempting to prove the 
opposite. 
His proposals on behalf of other disadvantaged minor-
ities were no more serious. Langer seemed incapable of 





would have a chance of passage. Although the titles of his 
proposals are impressive as they appear in the index to the 
Congressional Record, the text of the bills is inevitably 
simplistic and naive. The man identified by many of his 
colleagues as the senator most concerned with the plight of. 
children seemed himself ·to be possessed of a childlike faith 
that the world's problems could be solved by a series of 
simple decrees. 
Upon further analysis, most of Langer's humanitarian 
efforts in the Senate take on the character of the bill he 
introduced in June 1945 to require that 10 percent of all 
major league baseball players be returning veterans missing 
1 . b 12 one or more im s. Proposals such as this one were often 
comic and seemed to mock the very people Langer professed to 
want to help. 
Others of Langer's liberal and civil libertarian views 
have been regarded with satisfaction by liberals of today. 
Langer was suspicious of the activities of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, for example, and in 1949 sought to 
limit the duties CIA agents could perform while in the 
United States. Although he might vote alone, Langer said, 
he would not stand by while a "gestapo" was established in 
the United States "by which people may be hounded by a 
13 
central bureau." 
Langer opposed most military spending. Those who were 
in favor of large military expenditures following World War 
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II, were simply "hysterical with fear," he charged. 
Military funds, Langer went on to say, are by definition 
wasted, while money spent on domestic programs brings 
returns. 14 Langer also consistently opposed the military 
15 draft. 
When the Supreme Court's Harris decision broadened the 
right of search, Langer immediately introduced a bill to 
strengthen the laws against illegal search and seizure. 16 
In 1953, Langer was the only member of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee to oppose a bill designed to help 
congressional investigating panels force witnesses to answer 
questions. The bill was a direct blow to the Fifth Amend-
ment, but Langer opposed it because it granted immunity from 
prosecution for any offense mentioned in the hearing. Such 
immunity, Langer contended, would encourage criminals to 
broaden their testimony to enlarge their immunity. 17 
Langer had long been opposed to the type of tactics 
that characterized the witch hunts of the McCarthy era. In 
1942 he had mocked the Dies Committee's "guilt-by associa-
tion" tactics and disputed the notion that communists needed 
to be outlawed. "In North Dakota, we did not do as some 
other states have done, namely pass a law prohibiting a 
communist column on the ballot," he declared. "On the 
contrary, we had an investigation made to find out why a man 
would vote communist, and it did not take long to discover 
the reasons." Hunger, poverty, and hardship put people in a 
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position where they would "vote almost any kind of 
t . k t .. is 1C e. 
In July 1950, Karl Mundt of South Dakota maintained on 
the Senate floor that a train wreck in Missouri was caused 
by "subversive elements." When authorities revealed that i_n 
fact a prank by a group ·of boys had caused the accident, 
Langer reprimanded the South Dakotan: "It all goes to show 
how that in a time of hysteria, anything which may happen 
anywhere in the U. s., no matter how bad, may be blamed on 
some organization or person who is not at all guilty ... 1119 
The broad sweep of the hunt for subversives troubled 
Langer. "What about the peaceful advocacy of socialism?" he 
asked his fellow senators, wondering if they could find any 
American more loyal than the head of the Socialist Party, 
20 Norman Thomas. 
Loyalty boards appointed by the President were not 
consistent with the American conception of justice, Langer 
maintained, adding that such work was what the courts were 
for. 21 Bills against subversives were "the product of 
hysteria and frantic, unthinking fear" and struck at the 
foundation of American democratic institutions because they 
"required proof of no overt act or evil intent. 1122 The 
Nixon-Mundt bill proposed in 1950 to control un-American and 
subversive activities would, in Langer's words, "declare 
guilt by legislative fiat. 1123 Langer added that "this bill, 
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if enacted, would constitute the greatest threat to civil 
liberties since the alien and sedition laws of 1798. 1124 
Langer often defended those who he felt were denied a 
fair hearing when accused of subversion. Although dis-
claiming any connection to a group of New York communists on 
trial for subversion, Langer said, " .in America a 
murderer, a Communist, a Democrat, or a Republican, a 
smuggler or a bank robber, under the Constitution of the 
United States is entitled to a square deal when he goes into 
court." The judge in this particular case, according to 
Langer, had "hand-picked" the jury to obtain a conviction. 25 
Langer tied his arguments for racial equality to the 
issues of the Cold War. If the United States government was 
effectively to oppose communism abroad, Langer argued that 
it needed to protect liberties and the rights of minorities 
at home. "God only knows," he charged, "we have departed 
far enough from these sacred principles of reasoned and 
decent human conduct on the domestic scene. 1126 But Langer 
was also aware that the United States was not alone in this 
regard; the behavior in Africa of the England he hated was 
serving to drive blacks there "into the arms of the 
Soviets," he said in 1948. 27 
Communism was a threat, but the measures taken to 
combat communism were a larger threat. According to Langer, 
" . our American way of life is threatened whenever 
freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, or 
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freedom of worship is denied any group of persons in our 
land."28 To Langer, measures such as the Internal Security 
Act of 1950 threatened traditional American liberties. 
Many of Langer's impassioned pleas for the preservation 
of American liberties were not issued as a part of the 
debate over a particular bill but in response to attacks, 
real or imagined, upon groups near and dear to Langer's 
heart. When the Farmer's Union of North Dakota was labeled 
by a Senator from New Hampshire as a "communist front," 
Langer took the floor in protest, inserted enough articles 
and chapters of books in favor of the Farmer's Union to fill 
35 pages of the Congressional Record, and then launched into 
a long discussion of America's democratic ideals. 29 
In 1950, an attack on the Farmer's Union provided 
Langer with an opportunity to issue a characteristic protest 
against the guilt-by association mood of the time: "I know 
of no law which provides that a Communist cannot join a 
cooperative organization," he said, implying that it was 
neither troubling nor surprising that three communists may 
have found their way into the Farmer's Union and that their 
presence was no proof of communist influence in the 
. t" 30 organ1za ion. 
A second attack on a group dear to Langer was more a 
product of the Senator's imagination, or perhaps of his 
unwillingness to leave the Senate floor without delivering 
the tirade he had prepared for the day. After Louis Budenz 
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said in a Congressional hearing on the American communist 
movement that it had been Owen Lattimore's assignment to 
represent the Chinese communists as "nothing but North 
Dakota Non-Partisan Leaguers," Langer exploded on the Senate 
floor as if the NPL had been labelled a communist front. He 
was appalled that " ... a man who, so far as I know, never 
has been to North Dakota, should take the name of the Non-
Partisan League in vain, and even by innuendo or insinuation 
try to mix it up with Russian Communists. 1131 When Senator 
Owen Brewster of Maine pointed out that the statement was 
actually a compliment to the NPL, Langer would have none of 
it and proceeded to insert articles and chapters from books 
that filled twenty-three pages in the Record. 32 
Langer not only defended groups closely identified with 
North Dakota; when the National Lawyer's Guild was accused 
by Attorney General Brownall of subversion, Langer defended 
it on the Senate floor in a speech entitled "National 
Lawyer's Guild--Legal Bulwark of Democracy." "In my 
opinion," Langer said, "the Lawyer's [sic] of the National 
Lawyer's Guild are just as loyal as any Senator on this 
floor. 1133 Many criticized Langer for his defense of the 
Guild, but he responded by placing the responsibility for a 
final judgement on the office of the attorney general: 
"Certainly if there was any proof that the National Lawyer's 
Guild was communistic, I have every confidence that the 
Attorney General would have so designated them a long time 
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ago. 1134 After the attorney general castigated the Guild in 
stronger terms (although he never formally declared the 
Guild subversive), Langer was less friendly, calling the 
organization a "stench in the nostrils of every decent 
attorney," and a group that "without any question in the 
world, is communistic and properly designated as one of 
b . . . ..35 su versive activity. 
Langer's concern for civil liberties led him to 
associate himself with the Emergency Civil Liberties 
Committee directed by Clark Foreman and headquartered in New 
York City. Langer's staff worked closely with Foreman's. 
In August 1955, Langer agreed to allow Foreman to mail 5,000 
copies of a brief from his office, apparently under Langer's 
frank. After Foreman offered only to send the labels to 
Langer's office and pay for the labor of sticking them on 
the publication, Langer responded that "the work must be 
done under supervision in my office but you ~ill have to 
provide the manpower to do it. 1136 
In 1955, Langer was the featured speaker at a 
conference sponsored by the ECLC in Philadelphia. Although 
Langer received top billing, other prominent civil libertar-
ians present were Louis L. Redding of the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People, Nation writer 
Frank Donner, and I. F. Stone, editor of I. F. Stone's 
Weekly. 37 
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Langer's appearance at the conference puzzled some of 
his supporters and infuriated the editors of the Hearst 
newspaper chain. A veterans' group which had asked Langer 
to speak withdrew its invitation, and the New York Journal 
American fumed in an article entitled "Senator at Red-tinted 
Hoe Down" that Langer offered the "piece de resistance" in a 
"monotonous menu" of speeches, many of which were given by 
people who had been indicted on charges of being a 
cornmunist. 38 Langer continued to puzzle observers when only 
days after appearing at the ECLC conference he spoke ~o the 
anti-communist Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe 
and, according to the New York Herald Tribune, "won their 
he.arts. 1139 When asked about the apparent contradiction, 
Langer replied that "as a member of the United States 
Senate, I feel free to address any group of American 
. t. ..40 ci 1zens. 
In late 1955, Langer spoke at an "assembly for justice" 
in New York on behalf of Morton Sobell, an alleged communist 
sympathizer imprisoned in Alcatraz on charges of espionage. 
Hearst writer Leon Racht noted that according to the Daily 
Worker, Langer had said that he would do "everything in his 
power" to ~ee that "Mrs. Sobell's husband" received justice. 
Racht blasted Langer's "ranting" in front of "1,800 
communists and fellow travelers" and claimed that the 
Senator's propensity to back the common people against the 
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so-called "greedy, grasping" monopolies was further evidence 
of Langer's weakness on the communist issue. 41 
Civil liberties groups other than the ECLC lauded 
Langer's work to preserve civil liberties. A member of The 
Committee to End Sedition Laws wrote Langer and noted his 
"world reputation for fair play and insistence upon the 
• ht f 1 II 4 2 • • • Arn • ' rig so our peop e. Firing Line, An erican Legion 
publication, blasted Langer's affiliation with the ECLC and 
other "communist-front" groups. 43 After Langer addressed 
the ECLC in a rally at Carnegie Hall in New York City, the 
Federal Employees Veterans Association canceled a speech 
Langer was scheduled to deliver to them a few days later. A 
surprised Langer issued a press release which argued that 
veterans of any group should be concerned about their civil 
l 'b . 44 i erties. 
Langer was a humanitarian. He could not resist taking 
up the case of an underdog, no matter where that underdog 
might reside. He often, for example, took on the cases of 
residents of Washington D. C. He also endeared himself to 
his fellow Senators over the years by showing genuine 
concern for their families. Langer could not bear to ignore 
suffering if it was within his sight. 
There is also little doubt that Langer's concern for 
civil liberties was authentic. Some of Langer's longest and 
most impassioned letters are to non-North Dakotans and 
concern civil liberties. He worked diligently on behalf of 
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many he believed to be falsely accused of a crime even 
though few of them had any ties to North Dakota. He spent 
much time and energy promoting civil libertarian causes 
despite there being little probability that such efforts 
would increase his support at home. 
Yet his civil libertarian beliefs did not always hold 
sway; often they were overshadowed by other, more pressing 
concerns. And both Langer's humanitarianism and his civil 
libertarianism were handicapped by his inability to draft 
passable legislation. 
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IV 
Langer, Germany, and the Internal Security Act of 1950 
Langer's opposition to the Internal Security Act of 
1950 could be viewed as an act of courage in defense of 
civil liberties at a time when anti-communist hysteria was 
running high. Langer spoke against the Act at many times 
during the debate, and to prolong matters, he filibustered 
from midnight until he dropped of exhaustion at nearly five 
o'clock in the morning. He was taken by ambulance to 
Bethesda Naval Hospital where he remained for seven days. 
Langer's arguments against the Internal Security Act 
centered upon the effects that the Act would have on free 
speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of thought. But 
Langer's behavior after the Act's passage suggests that he 
had another motive in mind; passage of the Internal Security 
Act would make it more difficult for Germans and Austrians 
to enter the United States. Once the attorney general 
interpreted the Act in a way which allowed more Germans to 
immigrate to the United States, Langer's opposition to the 




Langer's opposition to an act which would limit the 
ability of Germans to immigrate was consistent with his 
career-long dedication to German causes. He had long 
deplored American policy in post-war Europe. In 1946 he had 
issued what was to be only the first of many long diatribes 
on the subject. His rhetoric at that time was even more 
inflated than usual: 
... when the whited sepulchers of our empty 
promises which are now being filled with the 
wasted flesh and bones of innocent and guilty 
alike are fully exposed to view, when our riches 
win us nothing but universal loathing, when we are 
unable longer to take the names of Jefferson, 
Washington, or Lincoln upon our lips without 
shame, when we must cast our eyes to dust at the 
mention of the name of our Lord and Master, then 
the American people will dema£d to know who has 
smeared them with this guilt. 
In 1947 Langer argued that the Morgenthau Plan to 
pastoralize Germany was designed "to make the annihilation 
and the extermination of the German nation and of the German 
people complete. 112 Also in 1947, Langer began to argue that 
American policy in Germany was the product of "deliberate 
betrayal" by communists within the Truman administration. 3 
In 1948 Langer railed against the "unholy" record of 
the United States Government in Germany. Charging that as 
many as 4,000,000 Germans had died from mistreatment or 
starvation during forced relocation programs, he maintained 
that an administration "blinded by wartime passions" was 
1' 
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following a war against Nazi inhumanity with equal 
inhumanities of its own. 4 
Langer was offended at the nature of the justice meted 
out by the United States military courts in occupied 
Germany. "We cannot have a double standard of justice, one 
brand for us at home and another for export," he said in 
1949. "We must get to the bottom of this shocking deviation 
from American principles . 115 As evidence of wrongdoing, 
Langer cited numerous beatings, forced confessions and 
hangings of Germans he believed were denied due process by 
. ff. . 1 6 American o icia s. 
Langer believed that even after the Soviets were no 
longer involved in the Nuremburg trials they continued to 
contol them from behind the scenes. Langer demanded that 
the payrolls of the American prosecution staff at the trials 
be subpeonaed by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Then, he 
claimed, " ... it will be seen that the entire prosecution 
staff was composed of leftists and men who since have been 
exposed as communists and members of communist front 
organizations. 117 Langer also revealed in 1949 that his 
German-American constituents in North Dakota unanimously 
agreed that unless America sent food to Germany, the 
communists would take over that country. 8 
Had not Langer's eccentricity and ineptitude already 
discredited him with the media and his fellow Senators, his 
use of the communist issue might have succeeded in bring-ing 
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attention to the German problem. His arguments echo those 
of the China Lobby, which assumed that policies that in 
retrospect worked to bring about the downfall of the 
Nationalist government in that country must by implication 
have been inspired and implemented by communist spies. 
Soon, however, the threat to the German cause was to come 
not from the State Department,· but from the Senate itself. 
When the Mundt-Nixon bill to control subversives was 
introduced in 1950, Langer objected to it on civil 
libertarian grounds, noting that it was opposed by many 
labor unions, the NAACP, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
and the National Lawyers Guild. Langer cited Charles Evans 
Hughes' opposition to anti-subversion measures and asked his 
fellow Senators if they thought Hughes had been a 
. t 9 communis . 
After Mundt-Nixon was incorporated into what was to 
become the Internal Security Act of 1950, it· became apparent 
to Langer that the Act's immigration restrictions and 
deportation provisions would greatly affect Germans 
attempting to immigrate to the United States as well as 
Germans who had already arrived. The Act, he later argued, 
would prevent 90 percent of those Germans who wished to come 
to the United States from doing so. 10 
Langer knew that it would be futile to argue for 
leniency for German immigrants while memories of World War 




compelling arguments against the Act concerned its effects 
upon traditional American civil liberties. Langer 
consistently worked to advance the cause of Germans, but his 
methods had come full circle from his earlier use of anti-
communism to discredit American policy in Germany, to his 
later contention that the Internal Security Act would harm 
traditional civil liberties. It simply would not work to 
charge that the Internal Security Act of 1950 was a 
communist plot, although Langer would later attempt to make 
such a connection. 
Despite Langer's use of anti-communist arguments to 
oppose American policy in Germany, Senator Pat McCarran of 
Nevada, the author of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 
attacked Langer for his opposition to the act by questioning 
his patriotism. The position Langer took, McCarran said, 
"is supported by every communist organization in the 
world. 1111 
Langer's opposition to the Internal Security Act led 
him to filibuster several times before his final, dramatic 
collapse on the floor of the Senate during the last day of 
debate. The bill passed while Langer was in the hospital, 
and Langer determined to work for its repeal. 
Less than two months out of the hospital, Langer 
traveled to Germany to assess the effects of the Internal 
Security Act on the German people. Upon his return, he gave 
a report to the Senate in which he alleged that the Act was 
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playing into the hands of the communists in Germany. "Just 
as with denazification," Langer said, "so this inter-
pretation of the security law tends to divide the Germans 
from the Americans," thus accomplishing the purpose of the 
communists and "fellow-travelers" in Washington. 12 In 
particular, Langer was offended that the act would bar from 
the United States former members of the Nazi youth who had 
joined the organization when they were as young as 10 years 
old. 13 
Langer's efforts were not in vain. In late December of 
1950, he received word from Senator McCarran that the 
hardship on Germans was caused by a "misinterpretation" of 
the law. 14 A few days later, the act was "reinterpreted" by 
the attorney general, and Langer was able to write a 
concerned citizen in Pennsylvania that the Senate "just 
didn't seem to have the nerve to repeal it [the Internal 
Security Act] as they should have, but this goes a long 
way."15 
Only a few more days later, Langer began to waffle on 
the issue to constituents who wrote supporting his previous 
stand against the Act. To one who wrote asking Langer to 
author a bill to repeal the Act, Langer replied that it 
would do no good to introduce such a bill because McCarran 
was chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and therefore there 
would be no chance to get such a bill out of cornrnittee. 16 
Such an excuse is particularly flimsy corning from Langer, 
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who throughout his career introduced hundreds upon hundreds 
of bills he knew would die in committee. Furthermore, when 
Langer replaced McCarran as chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee in 1953, he did nothing to repeal the bill. In 
fact, the reinterpretation by the attorney general seemed to 
satisfy all of Langer's objections to the Internal Security 
Act. 
Langer continued to charge that the communists were 
behind American policy in Germany. In early 1951 he 
proposed that a senate investigating committee look into the 
role of "the Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White crowd" in the 
siezure of German property following the war. At the same 
time, he nominated Senators McCarthy and Nixon, "who have 
worked admirably to ferret out communists" from the American 
government, to sit on the committee. 17 
Langer's opposition to the Internal Security Act as 
reinterpreted by the attorney general was limited to an 
occasional brief statement. Indeed, in 1954, Langer 
introduced an amendment to strengthen the Act by requiring 
that communist-front organizations not only had to register 
as such with the government, but had to register all of 
their printing equipment and printed materials as well. The 
amendment was to make illegal many "communist underground" 
printing facilities that Langer contended made up an 
"integral part of the conspiratorial operation of the 
Communists in this country ... 1118 
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As late as 1955, Langer wrote to constituents concerned 
about the discriminatory provisions in the Internal Security 
Act that he would "see what he could do" to get it 
repealed. 19 Langer's views became more evident in 1957 when 
a group of citizens wrote Langer in opposition to a change 
of the immigration laws that they feared would "permit the 
admission of Asiatics in wholesale numbers. 1120 Langer 
replied that he agreed, and would "keep on fighting against 
any measure which would weaken our present immigration 
.laws. 1121 
Although the immigration reform bill McCarran later co-
sponsored with Congressman Francis Walter of Pennsylvania 
(the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952) contained much that Langer 
could have found objectionable on civil-libertarian grounds, 
it also contained a provision that required positive proof 
that aliens who were "believers in Nazism and Fascism" had 
tried to advocate the establishment of those ideologies in 
the United States before such persons could be deported. 
That provision, as it happens, was objectionable to one 
German-American, President Dwight Eisenhower, but it may 
have served to smooth the passage of the bill through the 
Senate by silencing the opposition of the senior senator 
22 from North Dakota. 
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V 
Langer's Response to the McCarthy Era 
William Langer, like most Americans of his day, accepted 
the major premises of anti-communism. Although his sympathy 
for individual cases often led him to defend persons accused 
of having communist sympathies, and although his civil lib-
ertarian beliefs led him to question the methods used by the 
more zealous opponents of communism, Langer was a true 
believer in the perils of international communism. 
The foundations of Langer's anti-communism were laid 
during his early days as a progressive politician in North 
Dakota. Langer had left the Nonpartisan League in 1920 
because he thought the organization had come under the 
control of a few "elite" eastern intellectuals. In the same 
way, he saw communism in the Soviet Union and in Eastern 
Europe as an evil, not so much because it was atheistic and 
favored the redistribution of wealth, but because it 
represented to Langer a dictatorship of an intellectual 
elite at the expense of the common man, especially the 
farmer. Langer considered communists to be in the same 
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category as the interests and the monopolies. Both groups 
represented control over the many by the few. 
Langer's anti-communist ideas concentrated on improving 
the lot of the underprivileged: "We wiped out the communist 
party in North Dakota while I was governor," he believed, 
"not by force, not by taking their names off the ballot, but 
by having a government there of the people, for the people 
and by the people--a government where every man is king and 
every woman queen. 111 During the peak of the Cold War, 
Langer held that "The best way to wipe out communism is to 
see to it that every poor man owns his own home and his own 
2 property." 
Although the official policy of the United States 
government interpreted anti-communism to be nearly 
synonomous with opposition to the Soviet Union, Langer's 
anti-communism was consistently shaped by his "common man" 
philosophy. The difference between Langer's view and the 
official view became apparent in 1950 when the Senate voted 
to give aid to Yugoslavia in reward for Tito's resistance to 
Soviet hegemony. Langer balked. The United States govern-
ment, Langer charged, was "giving millions of dollars to a 
bloody Communist outfit which murdered hundreds of thousands 
of families, took hundreds of thousands of homes," and which 
was now looking to the United States to supply food the 
Yugoslav farmers had rightly refused to produce. 3 To Langer 
the communists in Yugoslavia represented to farmers there 
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the same evils the interests and monopolies represented to 
the farmers of North Dakota. "The common man," Langer said 
on the Senate floor, "doesn't want the communists in control 
any more than he wants the Rockefellers in control. 114 
Langer often emphasized the low regard communists held 
for the notion of private property and came to regard any 
threat to private property as a communist plot. Using the 
argument that confiscation of property is one of the first 
steps of a communist regime, Langer attempted to label the 
Allied confiscation of German property following World War 
II an implemenation of communist ideology. 5 In 1951, Langer 
wrote in a letter to John J. Mccloy, United States High 
Commissioner for Germany, " ... I have criticized 
unmercifully the denaz1fication program. I am entirely 
satisfied that if it was not instigated, it was assisted by 
the Communists. 116 
Langer's anti-communism, although built on the 
principles he inherited from the progressive movement, was 
never an end in itself; most often it was employed as a 
weapon in his fight against what he saw to be greater evils. 
Anti-communist activism is not a consistent theme in 
Langer's career. His two dalliances with th~ movement, 
during the Red Scare of the 1920's and from 1946 through the 
end of the McCarthy era, occurred only when anti-communism 
was the political weapon of choice. Langer actively sought 
out communists during his tenure as attorney general of 
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North Dakota, but soon gave up on the notion that it was 
possible to root out communists from society. From that 
time on, Langer employed anti-communism primarily as a tool 
to achieve other political ends, most prominently to protest 
the American occupation policies in Germany. 
Langer's ardent opposition to the Allied policy in 
occupied Germany stemmed from his desire to please his 
German constituency. Many of these North Dakotans received 
word from their relatives in Germany describing the 
conditions there, and many more attempted to help their 
relatives emigrate to the United States. Langer's goal was 
to moderate Allied policy in whatever way and by whatever 
means he could. He often chose as his tool the explosive 
issue of "communism in government." 
Langer had no sympathy for the State Department, which, 
he noted often, did not employ a single North Dakotan. He 
castigated its officials as persons "who have never milked a 
cow, who never worked a single day with their hands as day 
laborers, who never knew what it was like to try to support 
a family on $100 a month, and who have no more conception of 
the sweat and the labor that it takes to produce a dollar 
than the man on the moon." These men were the equivalent of 
the House of Morgan, Dillon, Read & Co., and the 
Rockefellers, "the millionaire autocracy. 117 
Langer's charges of communist infiltration in the State 
Department are more eloquent and would seem at first glance 
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to be even more disturbing to the sensitivities of a Cold 
War American than would the statements made by Senator 
McCarthy. But Langer's charges did not resonate with the 
press and with tne American people as did the charges made 
by McCarthy. Langer's eccentricity had already discredited 
him with the press, and.his charges were often hidden in a 
burst of feverish pronouncements, many of which were contra-
dictory. McCarthy was an effective propagandist while the 
media saw Langer as little more than a cranky relic of the 
past given over to occasional bursts of irrationality on the 
Senate floor. 
Many of Langer's speeches and letters to constituents 
were based on the assumption that the State Department was 
riddled with communists. "These Russian Communists [in the 
State Department] have just about succeeded in wrecking 
America," Langer wrote to J. M. Wylie of Fargo in 1950. "I 
don't know what else we can do to clean up the Communist 
situation as apparently there is no way of getting rid of 
Mr. Acheson unless the House brings impeachment proceed-
ings.118 American policy in Allied-occupied Germany provided 
Langer with ample opportunity to charge that the Department 
was infiltrated by persons taking directions from the 
Kremlin. 
Anti-communism dovetailed neatly with some of Langer's 
pet causes. He was easily able to use anti-communism to 











Langer, who was one of two senators to vote against the UN 
charter, often attempted to stain the organization with the 
alleged disloyalty of members of Truman's staff. In a 
speech against the UN in 1951, Langer charged that the 
blueprint for the international organization was drawn up by 
treasonous Alger Hiss. 9 
Langer's isolationism served at times to moderate his 
anti-communism. Although many politicians used the issue of 
international communism to justify an expanded American role 
overseas, Langer denied that the best way to fight communism 
was through force and increased military spending. Langer 
did not believe that the communist threat justified an 
increase in covert activities by American intelligence 
agencies. Such activities violated the principles upon 
which the United States was founded and they would threaten 
the civil liberties of Americans should the CIA turn its 
attention to within American borders. 
When the United States government, acting through the 
CIA, helped overthrow the government of Guatemala in 1954 
Langer was particularly critical, citing the lack of 
information given to Congress as his reason. "Is there a 
foreign invasion in Guatemala or is there a civil war?" he 
asked on the Senate floor. ''If it is a foreign invasion, 
exactly who are the invading forces and who are behind 
them? 1110 Langer doubted whether the issue in Guatemala 
really was the spread of a communist conspiracy and he 
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raised the question of whether the Central American 
country's problems might be due more to social injustices 
and the "baleful influence" of the United Fruit Company than 
to the "malignant machinations of international 
. ..11 
communism. 
Langer always regarded the CIA with suspicion, but he 
always treated the Federal Bureau of Investigation with 
respect. Langer trusted J. Edgar Hoover to have complete 
control over the issue of domestic communists. Never did 
Langer see fit to criticize the Bureau for possible 
violation of civil liberties. Only the CIA posed a threat 
of becoming "an American gestapo. 1112 
Hoover's agency was often useful to Langer, sometimes 
in unexpected ways. For example, Hoover's penchant for 
issuing exact numbers of communists in each state was 
helpful to Langer when he sought to refute charges that the 
North Dakota Nonpartisan League and Farmer's Union were 
communist. Langer used Hoover's numbers to show that North 
Dakota's handful of communists could not possibly threaten 
the national interest. 
Hoover often responded personally to Langer's many 
letters to the Bureau. In one case, in a typical Langer 
ploy, he forwarded to Hoover "for investigation" 
a post card from a Mr. Dilley in Detroit on which he 
scribbled "any Senator who would use his franking privilege 
to defend such a subversive bunch of traitors [as the 
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National Lawyers Guild] has enlisted in the red army under 
Stalin."13 Hoover informed Langer that he had dispatched 
two agents to interview Dilley and that the results of the 
interview would be forwarded to the attorney general's 
office. A subsequent letter from an assistant to the 
attorney general revealed that the frightened Mr. Dilley had 
produced absolutely no proof of Langer's communist 
affiliations when the agents confronted him. 14 
Langer used anti-communism only when it suited his 
ends. When President Eisenhower neglected to consult Langer 
before making several appointments to federal offices in 
North Dakota, Langer employed anti-communism to show his 
anger at the administration. As a direct result of Eisen-
hower's snub, Langer obstructed the confirmation of Earl 
Warren as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and insisted 
that the FBI determine whether Warren was a stooge of the 
Kremlin, as several letters to the North Dakota senator had 
charged. Later Langer "sent Washington puzzling," in the 
words of the U. S. News, with'a sporadic inquiry into 
charges that Federal Judge Luther Youngdahl was biased in 
favor of Owen Lattimore, who was about to be tried in 
Youngdahl's court on perjury charges. 15 Such allegations by 
Langer were, because Lattimore's case centered on charges of 
communism, tantamount to accusing Youngdahl of communist 
sympathies. 
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Langer never maintained that either Warren or Youngdahl 
were corrununists, but the credence he gave to spurious 
charges made in letters of questionable origin served to 
embarrass everyone involved. Perhaps the media suspected 
that Langer was making a mockery of the witchhunts; in any 
case, his charges never were taken seriously, even by the 
most virulently_ anti-corrununist groups. Langer did not make 
anti-corrununism an issue in his political campaigns, although 
Richard Nixon urged him to do so in 1951. 16 
Langer echoed McCarthy's charge that the Democrats in 
the executive branch had presided over "eighteen years of 
treason" in a speech prepared for delivery on the Senate 
floor in August 1950. At that time, Langer charged that 
" ... After 18 years of Democratic rule ... 18 years of 
appeasing corrununists--of alignments with foreign nations who 
today are in possession of all our secrets ... we stand at 
the lowest ebb in decades, sacrificing our youth in 
battle. 1117 But Langer's fury at the established political 
parties was not limited to the Democrats. He later inserted 
letters into the Record accusing Mr. Republican himself, 
Senator Robert Taft, of communist sympathies. 
Langer and Joseph McCarthy shared many characteristics. 
Both were from the midwest and were often in accord on farm 
issues. Both entered the Senate followed by charges of 
previous corruption in the politics of their home state. 
Both were outsiders in the Senate club. 
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Although skilled practitioners of the arm-around-the-
shoulder, glad-handing political style, both Langer and 
McCarthy seemed to suffer from feelings of inadequacy and 
inferiority which resulted in their propensity to exaggerate 
their achievements. Perhaps as a response to their initial 
rejection by Senate insiders, both were more than happy to 
manipulate the rules and trample upon the venerable 
traditions of the Senate. Both developed a personal 
following in their home states and across the nation 
independent of traditional party lines. 
Historian Richard Fried has described the principal 
elements of McCarthy's style as "recklessness in accusation, 
careless innaccuracy of statement, and abuse of those who 
criticized him." Such a description also describes Langer's 
methods at their worst. 18 
Although both were Republicans, Langer and McCarthy 
often opposed Eisenhower. The president feared McCarthy 
more; Eisenhower's disdain for the junior Senator from 
Wisconsin never interfered with McCarthy's control of 
federal patronage. Langer, however, was sometimes denied 
the privilege of advice on federal appointments, much to his 
d . 19 1smay. 
Not surprisingly, Langer's policy of supporting German 
causes led him to support McCarthy's advocacy of the cause 
of German SS troops who were scheduled to die for their part 
in the Malemedy massacre during World War II. There is no 
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indication, however, that the two Senators coordinated their 
efforts on behalf of the doomed Germans. 
When McCarthy attacked the alleged communists in the 
State Department on the Senate floor in February 1950, 
Langer rose briefly to support the Wisconsin senator. 20 
When other senators protested McCarthy's refusal to list the 
names of those accused of being communists, Langer noted 
that the Judiciary Committee had been investigating 
corrununists for more than half the year, and that he thought 
the senator from Wisconsin was entirely correct. 21 Langer 
left the floor as McCarthy continued his diatribe, however, 
and subsequently made a habit of absenting himself from the 
Senate when McCarthy was making his charges. Such behavior 
was unusual for Langer who usually remained in his front 
seat and listened intently to even the most esoteric and 
lengthy speeches. 
Langer defended McCarthy in 1951 when the Wisconsin 
senator came under attack from Senators Humphery, Harley 
Kilgore of West Virginia, and Herbert Lehmann of New York 
for his investigative tactics. McCarthy was not in 
Washington at the time, and Langer was "disgusted" that the 
Wisconsin senator did not have the opportunity to defend 
himself. Langer backed McCarthy's claims that communist 
spies had penetrated crucial areas of the United States 
government. In particular, Langer thought it unpardonable 
that the Roosevelt administration had given $2 billion to a 
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project (Los Alamos) that employed a spy who "day after day, 
as our government was developing the atom bomb, was giving 
the secrets to Russia." Given such activities, Langer 
questioned, what is a United States Senator to do but to 
investigate as McCarthy had done? 22 
Langer's defenses of McCarthy occurred early in 
McCarthy's era of prominence and could be seen as an attempt 
by Langer to discredit the State Department and the 
Roosevelt administration as much as they were an attempt to 
defend McCarthy. In any case, Langer did not defend 
McCarthy again on the Senate floor until the proceedings to 
censure the Wisconsin senator began in 1954. At that time 
Langer rose only to mention that Senator Bob LaFollette of 
Wisconsin had denied the authority of one group of Senators 
to compel another senator to appear before it, just as 
McCarthy had done when he ignored a subpeona to appear 
before a Senate cornrnittee. 23 
Although Langer approved of McCarthy's selection of 
targets, he could never reconcile himself to McCarthy's 
methods of guilt-by-association. Langer's ambivalence 
towards McCarthy is illustrated by his absence during most 
of McCarthy's diatribes. If Langer happened to be on the 
floor when McCarthy began, he stayed only long enough to ask 
a few harmless questions about communist infiltration in the 
State Department before leaving. 24 
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Langer was a firm believer in the virtues of temperance 
and a honorary member of the Women's Christian Temperance 
Union, and McCarthy's drinking habits may have offended him. 
When McCarthy begged to be excused from the Senate hearings 
on his censure because of an "arm injury," Langer may have 
shared the suspicions of those who believed McCarthy was 
merely "drying out." On Senate floor, Langer claimed to be 
"moved to tears" by McCarthy's problems and suggested that 
the Senate send him roses. True to form, Langer sent 
.McCarthy a bouquet of roses and received a thank you note 
from the hospitalized senator a few days later. 25 
Langer and McCarthy tangled briefly in 1953 after 
Langer became chairman of the Judiciary Committee. As 
chairman, Langer sought to maintain his committee's leading 
role in the investigation of communism in the face of a 
challenge by McCarthy, who was attempting to make the 
investigating subcommittee of the Government Operations 
Committee his platform for inquiries into the issue. Both 
McCarthy and Langer hoped to appoint Senator Horner Ferguson 
of Michigan to head their respective subcommittees. 26 
The dispute was settled by an agreement between Senator 
Jenner, who was to become the chairman of the Internal 
Security Committee under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary 
Committee, and McCarthy. Although McCarthy's committee "was 
not yielding any of its prerogatives," it would "leave the 
subversive field largely to Mr. Jenner. 1127 It appeared ·as 
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though the agreement would have the effect of divorcing 
McCarthy from the investigation of communism, but such was 
not the case. More significant than the agreement between 
Jenner and McCarthy was the Senate's decision to fund 
liberally each of the rival committees, 28 leaving the door 
open for McCarthy to continue his roughshod investigations 
by disregarding the spirit, if. not the letter, of his 
agreement with Jenner. 
In the battle over the authority to investigate 
communism in government, Langer had weighed in against 
McCarthy, as might be expected from the chairman of a 
committee whose jurisdiction was threatened. Because 
McCarthy disregarded the agreement between he and Jenner, 
the dispute ended in a short-term defeat for the Judiciary 
Committee. 
Langer refused to commit himself before the Senate vote 
to censure McCarthy in 1954. In the end he voted against 
the cen~ure, but he maintained all along that he was 
attempting to be impartial, just as if he were ''acting as 
judge and jury." Langer was troubled because he was 
convinced that the legal grounds on which the censure was 
based had little to do with the motives of many of the 
Senators voting for the censure. Rather than being 
subjected to a censure, Langer believed that a Senator 
should be either expelled by vote of the Senate or allowed 
to remain. 29 In a letter that explained his vote against 
94 
the censure to a resident of Brooklyn, Langer expressed his 
concern that if use of the censure motion become a norm, he 
would himself eventually be censured for his espousal of 
1 . . 30 unpopu ar opinions. 
Many of the issues raised in 1954 during the debate 
over the censure of McCarthy recalled those of Langer's 
seating debate in 1941, and Langer was fully aware that he 
was eventually seated due to confusion in the Senate over 
that body's authority to pass judgement on him. In 1941, 
the Senate decided to leave the matter in the hands of North 
Dakota voters. However, according to columnist David 
Lawrence, if the Senate had the right to judge McCarthy it 
might also have the authority to reopen Langer's case and 
judge him as well. 31 
Despite their many similarities, the anti-communism of 
McCarthy and the anti-communism of Langer differed. 
Although both were reckless in charging that government 
officials were communist, Langer sought less to gain 
publicity than to change United States policy in Germany. 
Langer's eccentricity discredited him with the media to the 
extent that his charges were usually not reported. Langer's 
charges were always broad and never made sensational claims 
that could be based upon documents. He only attacked 
persons already identified by others as possible communists, 
and his attacks were often so overblown that it was 
difficult to take them seriously. 
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Historian Micheal Rogin has placed Langer firmly in the 
McCarthyite camp, but it is probably not accurate to 
classify Langer as either a McCarthyite or an anti-
McCarthyite.32 Neither Langer's McCarthyism nor his defense 
of civil liberties were central to his political program. 
Both were used as tools to further what Langer thought was 
more important--the obstruction of a farm bill that he 
believed to be harmful to North Dakota farmers, for example, 
or his effort to cause a change in the policy that guided 
the Allies in occupied Germany. 
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VI 
Conclusion 
To William Langer, senatorial politics had nothing to 
do with the art of the possible and everything to do with 
the art of getting reelected to represent a state with a 
small population. Such an art required the passage of no 
legislation, only fastidious attention to the needs of 
individual constituents and the creation of an illusion of 
influence and importance. Langer created this illusion 
through personal contact, through the use of the 
Congressional Record, and by pulling publicity stunts which 
resulted in the occasional appearance of an article about 
him on the front page of the New York Times. Tales of 
Langer's work habits are no doubt true; sadly, only the 
effort he put into the cases of individual constituents did 
much good. 
There is something tragically compelling about this man 
who undeniably possessed humanitarian instincts; who was 
utterly devoted to his constituents and to his wife Lydia; 
and who was willing, even eager, to work long hours at the 
expense of his health for what he believed to be right. As 
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compelling as Langer's story is, however, those who search 
for something larger underlying the anecdotes heard to this 
day on the street corners and in the cafes of North Dakota 
are grasping at air: it is those stories alone that are the 
lasting legacy of Langer's senatorial career. 
Langer was perhaps· not so much incapable of entering 
serious debate as a senator as he was fully aware of and 
jealously protective of his luxurious irrelevance. Langer's 
impish behavior on the Senate floor, exemplified by the time 
when he pulled cigars one-by-one from the pocket of a 
Senator who was attempting to speak, adds credence to the 
characterization of Langer as a humorist crank. As such, he 
would be at home in a body such as the House of Commons, 
which, more than the United States Senate, maintains a 
healthy sense of humor towards the occasional oddball whom 
it seats. Langer's habit of sabotaging any attempt by his 
fellow senators to pass his own bills brings to mind the 
practice of the Canadian Hippopotamus party of running a 
second candidate against the first if it appears that the 
first is going to win. 
It is more appealing to a historian to view Langer as a 
relic from the Progressive Era or perhaps as Wayne Morse 
did, as the last of the prairie populists. His rambling, 
overblown rhetoric smacks of nineteenth-century oratory, and 
he often viewed contemporary times through the eyeglasses of 
a Theodore Roosevelt Republican. Langer's interminable 
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recitations on the Senate floor of his days as state's 
attorney in Morton County, attorney general of North Dakota, 
and governor seem to be nostalgic trips back to a time and a 
place which made sense to him. 
Langer defies most any categorization. Furthermore, to 
take Langer's pronouncements on the Senate floor at face 
value and to assert that "Langer was staunchly opposed to 
limits on filibuster," or "Langer was a fighter for civil 
rights," is to mislead. Langer's motives in Senate debate 
were muddled and complex, and his ideology, if he had one, 
was so eccentric to the 1940's and 1950's that it is 
impossible to view him in conventional terms. Langer's 
inablility to translate his ideas into law calls into 
question his seriousness as a Senator. It may be best to 
give him neither credit nor blame for the positions he took 
on the issues of the day. 
For Langer to know that he had tantalized serious 
people, especially academics, with his occasional bril-
liance; had tortured them with his contradictions; had 
amazed them with his complexity; and most of all, had fooled 
them into taking him seriously--would have caused him to 
smile with satisfaction. 
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